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Abstract: This study investigates the feasibility of proceeding with the proposed common currency in West Africa. 
By relying on the multivariate Structural Vector Autoregressive Approach (SVAR), the studies focuses on the 
symmetry, magnitude and variance decompositions of four underlying structural shocks (external/global shocks, 
domestic supply shocks, domestic demand shocks and exchange rate shocks) as a precondition for forming an 
optimal currency area. The study also emphasizes the alternative techniques of adjustment to asymmetric 
disturbances for economies in the sub-region. The findings reveal that there is relatively high degree of symmetry in 
the responses of the economies to external disturbances, while about 90% of the correlations in supply, demand and 
monetary shocks among West African countries are asymmetric. There are also qualified evidences that support the 
notion of low potential for factor mobility, intra-regional trade and openness across West African member States. 
The impulse responses among the countries are also dissimilar, suggesting that a Common Currency is not feasible 
in West Africa at the moment since the costs will outweigh the benefits. An incremental convergence approach to 
the introduction of a Common Currency in the region is recommended as the most viable option for West Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Regional integration, perceived as a means of 
ameliorating poverty among the peoples of West 
African states and a prelude to the creation of an 
Africa-wide currency union, has been the goal of the 
Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) which was founded in 1975.  
In April 2000, ECOWAS adopted a strategy of a 
two-track approach to the creation of a common 
currency in the area. For the first track, the non-
WAEMU members of ECOWAS were to form a second 
monetary union called the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ) by July 2005, with the second track being the 
subsequent merging of WAEMU and WAMZ to form a 
single currency union in the region with a common 
currency-the eco. To achieve the first track, leaders of 
six West African countries, namely: Nigeria, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia, Gambia and Sierra Leone declared 
their intention to proceed to a monetary union among 
the non-CFA franc countries of the region. The six 
countries committed themselves to reducing central 
bank financing of budget deficits to 10 percent of the 
previous year's government revenue; reducing budget 
deficits to 4 percent of GDP by 2003; creating a 
Convergence Council to help coordinate 
macroeconomic    policies; and setting up a common 
central bank-the West African Central Bank. The first 
track has been realized in 2005 while efforts are still 
ongoing to achieve the second track. 
Undoubtedly, the feasibility of a wider monetary 
unification in ECOWAS poses several economic and 
institutional problems as discussed by Tsangarides and 
Qureshi (2008) and Masson and Pattillo (2005). First, 
with the political dependence of most monetary 
authorities in ECOWAS on their national governments, 
their central banks are often under pressure to finance 
government deficits and undertake over-expansionary 
monetary policies. In West Africa, fiscal problems 
(resulting from undue dependence of the monetary 
authorities on their national governments) are much 
more severe and the credibility of monetary institutions 
is much more fragile. Second, if the unification of 
WAMZ and WAEMU and the adoption of the eco are 
realized, it is uncertain that the French Treasury’s 
guarantee of convertibility of WAEMU’s currency (the 
CFA franc) to the euro at a fixed parity would continue 
for a monetary union of the expected size. Other 
problems include the membership of the relatively large  
Nigeria economy (and the effects of its fiscal/monetary 
activities), the overlapping membership of many 
ECOWAS countries and the implications of the global 
financial crisis. Also, given the debt and financial crisis 
facing members of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), especially the euro-zone member states, a 
thorough appraisal of the feasibility of the proposed eco 
is desirable to ascertain if the proposed Currency Union 
is workable and sustainable. The objective of this study 
is, thus, to investigate whether or not the proposed 
Common Currency in West Africa is economically 
 
 
 
 
feasible or viable. To achieve this, the study focuses on 
the symmetry of shocks accruing to ECOWAS 
economies, the magnitude of impulse responses of the 
economies to the structural shocks and the 
decomposition of the shocks into their components.  
The standard framework used by economists to 
examine the desirability or viability of a monetary 
union is the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory 
introduced by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) 
and elaborated by Blanchard and Quah (1989), Vaubel 
(1978) and Krugman (1993), among others. The OCA 
theory focuses on whether or not the existence of a 
single currency in a particular geographical region 
would maximize economic efficiency. In other words, 
are the costs of forming a common currency less than 
the associated costs of exchange rate adjustments 
between countries in the event of macroeconomic 
shocks? According to Mundell (1961), this would be 
true in a situation in which the shocks were symmetric 
because this would entail all countries following the 
same adjustment policies, thus individual currencies 
will serve no purpose. But Mundell (1961) did not 
provide the technique for identifying and decomposing 
structural shocks. It was Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
who provided the empirical foundation of the OCA 
theory through their technique of identifying and 
decomposing structural shocks. Notably, when 
economies surrender their national currencies, the 
management of shocks (macroeconomic disturbances or 
national business cycles) is left to other policy 
instruments such as fiscal policy. But, since 
macroeconomic disturbances affect different economies 
differently, the analysis of costs of forming a currency 
union has been understandably concentrated on: 
 
 The symmetry/asymmetry of shocks  
 The alternative adjustment mechanisms such as the 
degree of trade/openness, labor/factor mobility and 
wage/price flexibility  
 
Thus, the main criteria of the Optimum Currency Area 
(OCA) are summarized in the degree of 
symmetry/asymmetry of business cycles across 
economies and the alternative ways of adjustment to 
non-synchronicity to these national business cycles 
(shocks). Depending on the extent to which these 
conditions are met, individual countries may enjoy 
benefits or suffer losses by joining a currency union. 
Some of the benefits accruable include: lower 
transaction costs, price stabilization, improved 
efficiency of resource allocation, enhanced trade and 
increased access to factor, labor and financial markets, 
among others. Costs include loss of siegnorage 
privilege and the sovereignty to maintain national 
monetary and exchange rate polices (Tsangarides and 
Qureshi, 2008; Karras, 2006; De Grauwe, 2005). 
Technically, the costs and benefits that may accrue to 
members of a monetary union can be measured by the 
symmetry (positive correlation) or asymmetry (negative 
correlation) of responses to exogenous disturbances 
affecting the members. Costs tend to be lower if the 
disturbances are symmetric and markets are flexible 
i.e., factor, labor and financial markets are quick to 
adjust back to equilibrium, and higher conversely. 
A few recent studies have investigated the cost and 
benefit of adopting a common currency in Sub-Sahara 
Africa and specifically in West Africa. Most of the 
studies use the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach 
which was developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to 
estimate the asymmetry of shocks accruing to different 
sub-regions in West Africa. In the ECOWAS sub-
region, Addison et al. (2005) apply a VAR model to the  
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) countries and 
find very low cross country correlations of terms of 
trade  shocks  and  real  exchange rate shocks. Debrun 
et al. (2005) use a conjectured model about the fiscal-
monetary policy mix in the region to assess the 
potential for monetary integration in ECOWAS. Their 
findings provide evidence of fiscal heterogeneity and 
abrogate Nigeria’s membership of the union as non-
beneficial unless it was accompanied by effective 
containment of Nigeria’s financing needs. Be´nassy-
Que´re´ and Coupet (2005) use crisp cluster analysis to 
examine different monetary arrangements in sub-
Saharan Africa. Their results again suggest that Nigeria 
should not form part of WAMZ, while the creation of 
the enlarged WAEMU and WAMZ zone in ECOWAS 
appear to be more economically viable without Nigeria. 
For East Africa, Buigut and Valev (2005) test the 
symmetry of underlying structural shocks in the region 
and find that the supply and demand shocks are 
generally asymmetric but that the magnitude (size of 
the impulse response coefficient) and speed of 
adjustment to shocks are congruous among the 
countries. Houssa (2008) uses a dynamic factor model 
to examine the economic costs of a monetary 
arrangement in West Africa. His findings show 
negative and low positive correlations among supply 
disturbances   across   the    countries,    with    greater 
similarity in the demand shocks among WAEMU 
countries. 
A consideration of the various contemporary 
studies on the proposed West African Monetary Union 
indicates that they all adopt a two-variable modeling 
approach, consisting always of demand and supply 
shocks. This study however, intends to bring additional 
value to literature in this area by extending its study to a 
multivariate (four-variable) structural vector 
autoregressive model to capture the correlation of 
external shocks and monetary shocks among countries. 
Thus, this study will further expand the predictive and 
objective capacity of decision on the viability of the 
proposed Currency Union in West Africa. 
 
 
 
 
THE PROCESS OF ECOWAS INTEGRATION 
 
Criterion 1: The degree of intra-regional trade and 
openness: 
The degree of intra-regional trade: The literature on 
optimal currency area emphasizes trade as the main 
channel through which benefits from a common 
currency will be enjoyed. The more countries trade with 
each other, especially in a particular region, the more 
they will value regional exchange   rate stability. In this 
regard, currency unions are expected to be welfare 
enhancing because they reduce the potential disruptions 
to intra-regional trade brought about by relative price 
fluctuations and disturbances in bi-lateral exchange 
rates. Moreover, Frankel and Rose (1996) provide 
empirical evidence to show that trade has positive 
impacts on growth and a common currency encourages 
trade in turn.  
Table 1 indicates that the diversification index for 
all the West African economies in 2009 and 2010 are 
high, with Mali having the highest value of 87% and 
Togo, the least value of 69% in 2010. Notably, in 
GATT negotiated tariff reduction, the concessions 
exchanged among the industrial countries are usually in 
commodity categories that these countries export to 
each other. Only to the extent that LDCs’ exports to 
OECD countries overlap the commodities exchanged 
by the DCs themselves, would any benefits flow to the 
LDCs from such GATT tariff cuts. The primary export 
structure (with limited range of products for export) of 
the ECOWAS economies promises little benefits from 
international trade and is the reason for high D.I and 
low T.C.I across West African states. Following the D.I  
 
Table 1: Trade concentration and diversification indices of merchandise exports and imports by countries, annual 2009-2010, of ECOWAS 
economies 
 
2009 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2010 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Economies Absolute values T.C.I D.I Absolute values T.C.I D.I 
Benin 140 0.35 0.75 138 0.37 0.75 
B. Faso 93 0.52 0.81 118 0.50 0.82 
C. d’Ivoire 166 0.36 0.71 180 0.35 0.70 
Gambia 18 0.35 0.72 23 0.32 0.69 
Ghana 222 0.46 0.83 228 0.46 0.82 
Guinea 92 0.61 0.80 92 0.44 0.81 
G. Bissau 12 0.89 0.75 12 0.89 0.75 
Mali 167 0.57 0.83 137 0.63 0.87 
Niger 84 0.43 0.86 100 0.38 0.80 
Nigeria 250 0.83 0.84 185 0.77 0.80 
Senegal 195 0.24 0.72 190 0.27 0.75 
S. Leone 217 0.24 0.64 220 0.27 0.71 
Togo 167 0.20 0.69 165 0.21 0.69 
UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; 
D.I = Diversification index. This index signals how the structure of exports or imports by product of a given country or group of countries differ 
from the structure of product of the world. The index ranges from 0 to 1 and reveals the extent of the differences between the structure of trade of 
a country (or country group) and the world average. An index value closer to 1 indicates a bigger difference of the structure of product of a 
country from the world average (Finger and Kreinin, 1979); 
T.C.I = Trade concentration index: This index shows how exports and imports of individual countries or group of countries are concentrated on 
several products or otherwise distributed in a more homogeneous manner among a series of products. Trade concentration index which is also 
called Herfindahl-Hirschmann index is, thus, a measure of the degree of market concentration. It has been normalized to obtain values ranking 
from 0 to 1. A value of 1 indicates maximum trade concentration 
 
Table 2: Trade openness (in % of nominal GDP) from 2005-2010 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Economy 
Benin 22.81 25.88 33.8 32.01 29.16 31.681 
Burkina Faso 18.73 20.58 20.1 20.62 19.94 22.762 
Cape Verde 46.20 52.01 56.1 57.17 48.16 50.202 
Cote d'Ivoire 49.07 46.60 46.3 45.80 45.26 44.764 
Gambia 29.86 33.26 32.6 26.06 26.57 21.410 
Ghana 29.36 31.45 31.4 32.98 34.56 34.578 
Guinea 33.40 40.33 31.7 41.63 27.33 37.753 
Guinea Bissau 21.78 21.63 27.8 27.46 24.04 24.656 
Liberia 129.6 170.8 163 195.4 125.7 116.61 
Mali 30.83 34.40 33 38.04 28.95 31.314 
Niger 25.58 24.68 25.4 28.62 38.91 39.975 
Nigeria 37.05 33.79 35.9 34.99 31.02 33.975 
Senegal 36.61 35.16 38 41.09 34.01 34.437 
Sierra Leone 21.65 21.79 20.4 20.72 20.49 30.418 
Togo 48.73 47.17 47 45.51 46.79 45.702 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Statistics (UNCTADstat); Trade openness which indicates roughly the size of international trade is 
calculated as average of exports and imports as a percentage of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
 
 
 
 
and T.C.I criteria, one can aver that the ECOWAS 
region may be incapable of harnessing the benefits of a 
currency union at the moment.  
 
The degree of trade openness: Due to scant statistics 
on intra-regional trade across ECOWAS member states, 
we examine the size of international trade (represented 
by trade openness)  across  West  African states in 
Table 2.   
Large size of international trade, like intra-regional 
trade, might contribute to more similar economic 
conditions despite differences in specialization. 
However, Table 2 shows that the degree of trade 
openness is generally low. Bulk of the figures is below 
the 50% benchmark. This is indicative of poor state of 
economic ties across the economies. 
 
Criterion 2: The degree of labor and factor mobility: 
In his seminal work, Mundell (1961) argues that an 
Optimal Currency Area (OCA) is a group of countries 
in which labor and factor mobility is relatively high. 
Due to scant statistics on cross-country labor flow in
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Fusion chart of total adult literacy rate (in percent) of people of ages 15 years and above in 10 ECOWAS member states 
 
Table 3: Total (all-sector) labor force employment and agricultural labor force employment in ECOWAS economies, 2005-2010 (in thousands) 
Year   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Economy Sector   
Benin All sectors 3212 3334 3456 3580 3698 3825
Agric. sector 1556 1582 1607 1631 1653 1674
Burkina Faso All sectors 6275 6488 6699 6908 7137 7366
Agric. sector 5677 5892 6120 6351 6589 6835
Côte d'Ivoire All sectors 7522 7709 7911 8126 8367 8606
Agric. sector 3053 3052 3057 3062 3068 3074
Gambia All sectors 681 701 722 743 765 788
Agric. sector 535 550 565 581 596 612
Ghana All sectors 9851 10114 10379 10647 10944 11232
Agric. sector 5411 5516 5664 5790 5922 6058
Guinea All sectors 4397 4500 4610 4720 4850 4988
Agric. sector 3606 3668 3731 3801 3879 3964
Guinea-Bissau All sectors 605 617 631 645 660 676
Agric. sector 449 457 462 470 478 486
Mali All sectors 3388 3480 3578 3672 3767 3869
Agric. sector 2420 2464 2511 2551 2592 2635
Niger All sectors 4198 4326 4463 4592 4803 4973
Agric. sector 3639 3764 3895 4036 4183 4336
Nigeria All sectors 44906 46110 47330 48613 49998 51349
Agric. sector 12376 12341 12312 12285 12257 12230
Senegal All sectors 4769 4923 5078 5242 5408 5580
Agric. sector 3454 3541 3642 3742 3845 3952
Sierra Leone All sectors 1952 2007 2055 2102 2141 2188
Agric. sector 1215 1241 1261 1281 1300 1320
Togo All sectors 2594 2680 2772 2866 2962 3059
Agric. sector 1329 1352 1375 1399 1424 1449
United Nation Conference on Trade and statistics (UNCTAD stat); Chart developed from data sourced from literature; Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, 
Togo and Sierra Leone are not included in Fig. 1 due to insufficient data 
 
 
 
 
the region, adult literacy rate or expenditure on 
education (a measure of the potential for human capital 
development and labor mobility) and the number of 
labor employed in agricultural/all sectors are employed 
as crude estimators of intra-regional labor mobility 
(Buigut and Valev, 2005; Chuku, 2012). Table 3, 
depicts the structure of labor force in ECOWAS 
economies, showing clearly the thousand number of 
labor employed in all sectors and those employed in 
agricultural sector between 2005 and 2010.  
The structure of labor force in Table 3 indicates 
that the influential agricultural sector accounted for 53 
to 95% of the total employed lab our in these 
economies. Since agriculture as a primary sector 
requires a large unskilled labor force which has low 
occupational mobility, we do not expect very high level 
of labor and factor mobility given the prevailing state of 
the economy. In terms of adult literacy rate, Fig. 1 
shows that adult literacy level has been low, indeed less 
than 40% in most of the economies, except in Cape 
Verde and Ghana. Again, this is a pointer to poor 
potential for intra-regional labor mobility. Literacy rate 
is highest in Cape Verde followed by Ghana. 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND DATA 
 
Methodology: From the analytical point of view, we 
emphasize the symmetry of underlying disturbances 
(structural shocks), the responses of the economy to 
these disturbances (impulse responses) and the 
decomposition of these shocks into the component 
sources. 
 
The model (Structural Vector Autoregressive, 
SVAR, model): Let us consider a structural Moving 
Average (MA) of a vector of variables ܺ௧ and an equal 
number of structural shocks, ߝ௧, so that: 
 
ܺ௧ ൌ 	ܣ଴ߝ௧ ൅ ܣଵߝ௧ିଵ ൅	ܣଶߝ௧ିଶ ൅	⋯ ൌ	∑ ܣ௜ߝ௧ି௜∞௜ୀ଴   (1) 
 
Recall that a Moving Average stochastic process 
(MA) is simply a linear combination of white noise 
innovations (Gudjarati, 2004: 839) in matrix form, 
equation 1 can be written as: 
 
 ܺ௧ ൌ 	࡭൫ܮሶ ൯ߝ௧	                                                      (2) 
 
 where, ܺ௧ ൌ ሾ∆ݕ௧∗, ∆ݕ௧, ∆݁௧, ∆݌௧ሿ′, comprising world 
real GDP denoted by ݕ௧∗, domestic real GDP denoted by 
ݕ௧, real exchange rate denoted by  ݁௧ and domestic price 
level denoted by ݌௧ all in log-difference forms.  
ܣ	is a 4*4 matrix that defines the impulse response 
coefficients of endogenous variables to structural 
shocks ߝ௧ ൌ ሾߝ௧௦∗, ߝ௧௦, ߝ௧ௗ, ߝ௧௠ሿ′ consisting of external 
world supply shock (ߝ௧௦∗ሻ, domestic supply shock (ߝ௧௦ሻ, 
domestic demand shock (ߝ௧ௗሻ, and monetary shock (ߝ௧௠) 
respectively. The Impulse Response Function (IRF) 
traces the dynamic effects of a one-time (or a one-
standard deviation or a one cholesky’s factor) shock to 
one innovation (or shock to one endogenous variable) 
on the current and future values of the other variables in 
the SVAR (EViews 5.0 User Guide, p.715). 
We assume that the structural shocks ሺߝ௧ሻ are 
serially uncorrelated and orthonormal. The assumption 
that ߝ௧ is orthonormal implies that the covariance 
matrix is normalized to the identity matrix such that: E 
[ߝ௧. ߝ௧′] = 1 
 
The decomposition of the structural model: By 
specifying four kinds of shocks, namely, shocks to 
world real GDP, domestic real GDP, real effective 
exchange rate and inflation, the decomposition of the 
series is done as follows: 
 
∆ݕ௧∗ ൌ ܣଵଵሺܮሻߝ௧௦∗			                                               (3) 
 
∆ݕ௧ ൌ ܣଶଵሺܮሻߝ௧௦∗ 	൅	ܣଶଶሺܮሻߝ௧௦ 	൅	ܣଶଷሺܮሻߝ௧ௗ ൅ܣଶସሺܮሻߝ௧௠	                                                            (4) 
 
∆݁௧ ൌ ܣଷଵሺܮሻߝ௧௦∗ 	൅	ܣଷଶሺܮሻߝ௧௦ 	൅	ܣଷଷሺܮሻߝ௧ௗ ൅	ܣଷସሺܮሻߝ௧௠                                                            (5)   
                      
∆݌௧ ൌ ܣସଵሺܮሻߝ௧௦∗ 	൅	ܣସଶሺܮሻߝ௧௦ 	൅	ܣସଷሺܮሻߝ௧ௗ ൅	ܣସସሺܮሻߝ௧௠                                                            (6) 
 
The decomposition presented in Eq. (3) through (6) 
is simple and intuitive. They imply that world GDP is 
not endogenous (i.e., it is strictly exogenous) to 
country-specific domestic structural shocks, while all 
domestic variables are affected by shocks to global 
output. Thus, as regards the effects of the shocks on the 
variables, we make the following assumptions: 
 
 Global real GDP is posited to be strictly 
exogenous. This is based on the understanding that 
all the ECOWAS economies are relatively small 
and open economies, having no significant 
contribution to global output.  
 Domestic real GDP is affected only by external 
shocks and shocks from itself in the long-run. 
However, it is not affected by monetary 
shocks	ሺߝ௧௠) or demand shocks	ሺߝ௧ௗሻ. This 
restriction is in line with Blanchard’s natural rate 
hypothesis and it implies that: ∑ ܣଶଵ௜ ്∞௜ୀ଴0, ∑ ܣଶଶ௜ ് 0,∞௜ୀ଴ ∑ ܣଶଷ௜ ൌ 0	∞௜ୀ଴  and    ∑ ܣଶସ௜ ൌ∞௜ୀ଴0	. 
 The real effective exchange rate is assumed to be 
affected by external shocks, domestic supply 
shocks and domestic demand shocks, but it is not 
affected in the long-run by a monetary shock. This 
restriction implies that, ∑ ܣଷସ௜ ൌ 0∞௜ୀ଴ .   The domestic price level is assumed to be strictly 
endogenous, implying that the prices are affected 
 
 
 
 
by shocks in global GDP (external shocks), 
domestic supply shocks, demand shocks and 
monetary shocks too. 
 
The entire model can be rewritten as a system of 
structural equations as follows: 
 
ۏ
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ۑ
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                                                                                              (7) 
 
Following Amisano and Giannini (1997) and 
Huang and Guo (2005), we do not directly recover 
estimates of the structural shocks from the structural 
moving average model in equation 1. Rather, we 
estimate a reduced-form (modified) VAR model for the 
observed variables. In the passing, recall that an 
Autoregressive process (AR) per se is an “a theoretical” 
and stochastic process in which each endogenous 
variable is expressed as a function on its own lagged 
value(s). In the modified VAR model, the external 
variables follow a pure Autoregressive (AR) process in 
that it is expressed solely as a function of its own 
lagged value(s). But the three domestic (endogenous) 
variables are modeled as functions of their own lags 
and the lags of the external variables. Thus: 
 
∆ݕ௧∗ ൌ 	Φ൅	∑ Ψ௜∆ݕ௧ି௜∗௡௜ୀଵ ൅	ߤ௧ଵ                         (8)   
 
And 
 
	ܺ௧ ൌ 	Ω൅	∑ α௜ܺ௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅	∑ Ω୧∆ݕ௧ି௜∗௡௜ୀଵ ൅	ߤ௧            (9) 
 
where, ܺ௧ ൌ ሾ∆ݕ௧, ∆݁௧, ∆݌௧ሿ′, α௜ and Ω୧ are coefficient 
matrixes, while ߤ௧ଵ and ߤ௧ ൌ ሾߤ௧ଶ, ߤ௧ଷ, ߤ௧ସሿ are reduced-
form or observed residuals (mixture of structural 
innovations). Thus, the reduced-form innovations (ߤ௧ሻ 
are composites of structural innovation (ߝ௧).  
Assume that the first difference transformation will 
make the variables stationary; the structural innovations 
can safely be recovered from the reduced-form 
residuals. In fact, it can be shown that structural 
innovations can be recovered as linear combinations of 
reduced-form innovations. The reduced-form 
innovations are indeed composites of the structural 
innovations (Buigut and Valev, 2005). Following 
Haung and Quah (2005), recovering structural 
innovations involves a special decomposition of 
reduced-form innovations which is achieved by OLS 
estimation of Eq. (9).  
We can write Eq. (9) as a MA representation of the 
form: 
ܺ௧ ൌ 	ߠ ൅	∑ G௜ߤ௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ                                        (10) 
 
where,  
    
 ߠ ൌ ሺܫ െ ∑ Γ௜௡௜ୀଵ ሻିଵ	ሺ	߬ ൅	∑ Ω௜∆ݕ௧ି௜∗௡௜ୀଵ ሻ        (11) 
 
Notice that Eq. (10) is a mere elaboration of the 
Moving Average (MA) process in Eq. (1) 
The term G௜ is called impulse response and is 
procured from: 
 
∑ G୨ܮ௝∞௝ୀ଴ ൌ ሺܫ െ ∑ Γ௜ܮ௜௡௜ୀଵ ሻିଵ	                     (12) 
 
As we see in quantitative econometrics software 
(Eviews 5.0 User Guide: 717), Amisano and Giannini 
(1997) demonstrate that the class of SVAR that E views 
estimates may be written as: 
 
G଴ߤ௧ ൌ 	ܣ଴ߝ௧                                                      (13) 
   
where, as usual,  
 
 ߤ௧ = Observed or reduced-form innovation  
 ߝ௧ = Unobserved or structural innovation 
 G଴&ܣ଴ = k*k matrices to be estimated 
 G଴ = Estimates of the coefficients in the reduced-
form (SVAR) model. 
 ܣ଴ = Impulse response coefficients from the 
Impulse Response Function (IRF)  
 
The assumption that the structural innovations are 
orthogonal which means that its covariance matrix is an 
identity matrix, E[ߝ௧. ߝ௧′] = 1, imposes the following 
identifying restrictions on G଴ and ܣ଴: 
 
G଴. E[ߝ௧. ߝ௧′] .G଴′   = ܣ଴ܣ଴′                                 (14) 
 
Noting that the expression on either side of Eq. 
(14) are symmetric, this imposes k (k+1)/2 restrictions 
on the 2k2 unknown elements of G଴ and ܣ଴. Therefore, 
in order to identify G଴and ܣ଴, we need to supply at least 
2k2- k (k+1)2 = k (3k-1)/2 additional restrictions. These 
restrictions imply that ܣሺܮሻ is the unique Cholesky 
lower triangle. Thus, it is sufficient to identify the 
structural ܣ௜ matrix and the time series of structural 
shocks ߝ௧ ൌ ሾߝ௧௦∗, ߝ௧௦, ߝ௧ௗ, ߝ௧௠ሿ′ by using ߝ௧ ൌ ܣ଴ିଵߤ௧. In 
other words, structural shocks can be recovered as 
linear combinations of reduced-form innovations.  
By computing the correlation of the shocks in West 
African economies, we can evaluate the feasibility of a 
common currency in the region. Positive and significant 
(above 50%) correlation coefficients signals that 
countries will require a synchronous policy response 
which is crucial for a centralized monetary policy 
management in the region. 
 
Data description: Annual data for the 15 ECOWAS 
economies are used for the study. The sample covers 
the period between 1970 and 2010. This time frame will 
 
 
 
 
give us the benefit of also accounting for the effects of 
the 2007/08 global financial shocks (which is an 
example of an external global shock) on the domestic 
economies. The data sets are extracted from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Development Indicators CD-ROM published by 
the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Statistics (UNCTAD stat). Domestic output 
is proxied by country GDP at 2000 constant US$. The 
real exchange rate series are sourced from IMF’s IFS 
and it is computed based on unit labor cost for a basket 
of 26 advanced countries and the Euro area as a group. 
 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATI0N OF RESULT 
 
Identifying the shocks (preliminaries): The result of 
unit root test conducted on the external variables and 
the three endogenous variables reveal that the global 
real output, domestic real output, real effective 
exchange rate and price level all contain unit roots for 
each economy, although the degree of significance 
varies across economies and variables. This means that 
these time series are integrated of order one, I (1). Thus, 
the first differences of the variables are used to ensure 
stationary. The tests for stability using the 
Autoregressive (AR) root tables and graphs show that 
all the roots have modulus less than one and lie inside 
the unit circle. Thus, the SVAR is covariance 
stationary. For the estimation of the empirical four-
variable SVAR, the number of lags is set to two in all 
cases since both the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Swartz Information Criterion (SIC) 
indicate that all the models have an optimal lag length 
of one or two. The lag length of two ensures that the 
estimates from the structural VAR are consistent. The 
results of the autocorrelation LM test   indicate absence  
of    serial    correlations   In    the    SVAR    estimates. 
 
Table 4: Correlation of domestic supply shocks (1970-2010) 
 BEN BFA CIV GHA GMB GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO 
BEN             
BFA  0.390668            
CIV -0.001280  0.16736           
GHA  0.444769 -0.02153  0.01566          
GMB -0.488420 -0.40972  0.05693 -0.266971         
GNB -0.041810  0.05741  0.45853     0.005645  0.042029        
MLI -0.123980 -0.45583  0.18484  0.215272  0.149476  0.168221       
NER  0.033878 -0.14163  0.46151 -0.064208  0.059004  0.234455  0.23589      
NGA -0.123750 -0.05411 -0.15817  0.226164  0.028088 -0.05391  0.27125 0.13584     
SEN  0.009940  0.26035  0.32464 -0.114236 -0.03400 -0.07206 -0.00012 0.337343  0.388066    
SLE  0.124415 -0.06515 -0.28445 -0.075074 -0.12648 -0.08705 -0.30679 0.168883 -0.15416  0.150150   
TGO -0.080080  0.32288  0.18857 -0.102086  0.057211  0.54737* -0.06802 0.088962 -0.23691 -0.056306 -0.59009  
Study; *: Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; Positive and statistically significant correlation indicates symmetry while negative correlation shows 
asymmetry 
 
Table 5: Correlation of domestic demand shocks (1970-2010) 
 BEN BFA CIV GHA GMB GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE 
BEN            
BFA  0.275897           
CIV  0.901450*  0.43995          
GHA -0.901960 -0.73880 -0.745198         
GMB -0.206477 -0.36490 -0.163687  0.17821        
GNB  0.149318 -0.12270  0.103819  0.14995  0.07926       
MLI  0.762114*  0.28560  0.844976* -0.83309 -0.06922 -0.060611      
NER  0.687885*  0.14509  0.415088 -0.32378 -0.19812 -0.091722  0.293246     
NGA  0.182076  0.11911  0.119662  0.00722  0.41077  0.150673  0.006054  0.205233     
SEN  0.899574*  0.37619  0.721119* -0.40824 -0.27064 -0.155634  0.488182  0.625049*  0.137101   
SLE  0.046311  0.06279 -0.100126  0.05484  0.31876  0.076871 -0.044445 -0.114266  0.467333 0.125952  
TGO  0.736375*  0.62205*  0.391169 -0.76328 -0.32413 -0.293418  0.477974  0.593830* -0.012301 0.909701* 0.222 
Study; *: Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; Positive and statistically significant correlation indicates symmetry while negative correlation shows 
asymmetry 
 
Table 6: Correlations of monetary shocks (1970-2010) 
 BEN BFA CIV GHA GMB GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO 
BEN             
BFA  0.45908            
CIV  0.71685*  0.44156           
GHA  0.12032  0.05803  0.22902          
GMB -0.43876  0.29354 -0.04230 -0.147020         
GNB  0.19532 -0.05986  0.31372  0.196278 -0.047930        
MLI  0.20019  0.25274  0.34163  0.305991 -0.006120 -0.20456       
NER -0.11700  0.01127  0.35823  0.555528*  0.421608  0.46751  0.05174      
NGA  0.09481  0.25855  0.17187  0.328525 -0.019690  0.00249  0.06675  0.49110     
SEN  0.09365  0.27368  0.17136  0.204153  0.258959 -0.22042  0.50246*  0.21135 -0.15287    
SLE -0.08582  0.48170 -0.20820  0.193474  0.125919  0.16120 -0.34010 -0.32060 -0.05741 -0.33142   
TGO  0.26188  0.29114  0.49380 -0.092500  0.114068  0.19876 -0.11750  0.45670  0.33426 -0.08787 0.2035  
Study; *: Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; Positive and statistically significant correlation indicates symmetry while negative correlation shows 
asymmetry 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Correlations of external shocks (1970-2010) 
 BEN BFA CIV GHA GMB GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO 
BEN             
BFA 0.600660            
CIV 0.825764 0.749436           
GHA 0.882794 0.213373 0.787410          
GMB 0.654078 0.825929 0.642248 0.71938         
GNB 0.760926 0.688270 0.726639 0.81609 0.79914        
MLI 0.780583 0.589356 0.664514 0.66710 0.68392 0.8200       
NER 0.647833 0.912585 0.580019 0.34354 0.56209 0.7955 0.94704      
NGA 0.705246 0.812499 0.729067 0.69618 0.86463 0.7318 0.78675 0.68658     
SEN 0.803723 0.969643 0.578422 0.75918 0.82707 0.6902 0.78069 0.81141 0.8153    
SLE 0.778261 0.880291 0.765641 0.75855 0.91222 0.8396 0.73196 0.62908 0.9346 0.85797   
TGO 0.570103 0.254114 0.517046 0.66192 0.27491 0.6774 0.78814 0.70066 0.3949 0.52795 0.26163  
Study; *: Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; Positive and statistically significant correlation indicates symmetry while negative 
correlation shows asymmetry 
 
Correlation of structural shocks:  Table 4, 5, 6 and 7 
report the correlation of identified structural shocks. 
The positive and statistically significant results indicate 
symmetric correlation. Symmetric or synchronous 
correlations are asterisked and red-underlined. The 
more symmetric the shocks are, the more feasible it 
becomes for the West African states to operate a 
common currency. We first look at the domestic supply 
shocks in Table 4 as they are more critical since they 
are more likely to be invariant to demand management 
policies (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Buigut and 
Valev, 2005; Chuku, 2012). 
 
Correlation of domestic supply shocks: Regrettably, 
the contemporaneous supply shocks are largely 
asymmetric. Where the correlation are positive, they are 
small and insignificant which reflect the differences in 
the core primary export commodities as discussed in 
section 2. Only the supply shocks for Togo and Guinea 
Bissau are significant and positively correlated. This 
result shows that policy synchronization among the 
West African countries may be ineffective since the 
economies would require different policy responses to 
adjust to these asymmetric supply shocks.  
 
Correlation of demand shocks: Out of the 66 pairs of 
ECOWAS member states examined, only eleven 
countries have significant symmetric correlation in 
domestic demand shocks. This is indicative of the weak 
inter-demand relationships among West African 
countries. None of the WAMZ member states has 
symmetric correlation in demand shock. The 
preponderance of asymmetric correlation in demand 
shocks among WAEMU countries is similar to the 
finding by Fielding and Shield (2001) for CFA zone of 
which WAEMU is a subset. 
 
Correlation of monetary shocks: As regards the 
correlations of monetary shocks, out of the 66 pairs of 
West African countries considered, only 3 pairs of 
countries have symmetric correlation in monetary 
shocks. Intuitively, this result follows from non-
synchronicity of demand shocks among the economies. 
In specifics, the symmetric correlation of monetary 
shocks occurs between Benin and Cote d’Ivoire 
(0.71685), Niger and Ghana (0.555528) and between 
Senegal and Mali (0.50246).  
 
Correlation of external shocks: From Table 7, the 
correlations of external shocks are highly significant for 
most West African countries except for four pairs of 
countries. This is attributable to the similarity in the 
primary export-oriented structure of most West African 
economies (Chuku, 2012). Ceteris paribus, the higher 
the correlation of shocks from the external source, the 
greater will be the benefit for countries in the region to 
form a currency union. But we must caution that there 
should not be much fuse about these results because 
synchronous external shocks almost always tends to be 
associated with similarity in export-structure (Haung 
and Guo, 2005).Thus, the high degree of synchronicity 
in the correlation of external shocks must be interpreted 
with a grain of salt.  
 
The dynamics of shocks: The dynamic effect of the 
structural shocks on the current and further values of 
the endogenous variables is captured by the impulse 
response and variance decomposition analysis. While 
the impulse response function traces the dynamic effect 
of a one time (or one standard deviation) shock to one 
innovation (or one endogenous variable) on the current 
and future values of other variables in the VAR system, 
the variance decomposition separates (or decomposes) 
the variation in an endogenous variable into the 
component shocks to the VAR (Haung and Guo, 2005; 
Eviews 5.0 User Guide, p.715). 
 
The impulse response function: The impulse response 
graphs (functions) in Fig. 2 measure the dynamic effect 
of a one-standard deviation of a particular structural 
shock (supply shock, demand shock and monetary 
shock) on Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) over a 
range of 10-year period for each West African State 
under analysis 
What emerges from Fig. 2 is that the response of 
real effective exchange rate to demand shocks and 
monetary shocks have been variegated but fairly 
distributed between negative and positive values. 
Overall, dissimilar patterns surface across the board, 
when  the  impact  of   the  structural  demand  shocks is  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
             
                
             
 
              
 
                
 
Fig. 2: Impulse responses of Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) to structural shocks 
Study; Each of graphical functions in Fig. 2 is generated as combined graphs of the responses of REER to three shocks 
(supply, demand and monetary shocks) 
RESPONSE OF REER TO SUPPLY SHOCKS
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Fig. 3: The relative impact of supply shocks on the variation 
in the endogenous variables across West African states  
(Study) 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: The relative impact of demand shocks on the variation 
in the endogenous variables across West African states 
(Study) 
 
looked at. An instant positive or negative response of 
real exchange rate can be observed which later trail off 
with a downward or upward trend. After some years, 
the effects edges towards zero. As regards the effects of 
supply shocks, it can be   observed that it provokes both  
a positive and negative response of the real exchange 
rate for West Africa economies, although the time path 
and magnitude of responses vary. 
The ambiguous effects of a typical supply shock on 
the real  exchange rates and  the variation in the later on  
 
 
Fig. 5: The relative impact of monetary shocks on the variation in the 
endogenous variables across West African states (Study) 
 
trade/economic magnitudes (for different West African 
economies) appear consistent with what the theoretical 
macroeconomics predicts. Theoretically, an increase in 
exchange rate volatility should be a hindrance to trade 
flows. However, various empirical analyses show that 
the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade (and on 
virtually any macroeconomic aggregates) are 
ambiguous. This difference between theoretical 
postulates and empirical findings has been termed the 
exchange rate disconnect puzzle (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
2000). Undoubtedly, as long as exchange rate volatility 
affects transaction costs and adjustment to such cost is 
neither free nor automatic, trade flows will be 
negatively affected. But irrespective of empirical 
findings on the effects of exchange rate variability on 
trade and other macroeconomic variables, there is 
potential for a single monetary zone to positively affect 
intra-regional trade in West Africa. What is needed is 
proper harmonization and coordination of policies 
necessary for the pursuance of a currency union in 
region. 
 
Variance decomposition: By showing the contribution 
of each shock to the movement in an economic 
variable, the variance decomposition gives an 
indication of which shock is more predominant in 
accounting for the variability in the variable. This is 
important because differences in the cause of the 
variability in the countries could be indicative of 
underlying differences in transmission mechanism and 
policy strategies of West African economies, which 
may be potential obstacles to regional monetary 
unification. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the impact of 
various shocks on each of the endogenous variables, 
namely, domestic real GDP, Real Effective Exchange 
Rate (EXCH) and the rate of Inflation (INF) across 
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ECOWAS economies. The responses to the shocks are 
measured as an average of a medium time (10-year) 
horizon from the variance decomposition estimates. 
Figure 3 shows that supply shock exerted the 
highest degree of swings on domestic real GDP.  
Figure 4 shows that demand shocks exerted the 
highest degree of swings on exchange rate.  
Figure 5 show that monetary shocks exerted the 
highest degree of swings on inflation. 
Overall, the variance decomposition analysis above 
shows that shock from the monetary sector is the major 
cause of domestic price fluctuations across ECOWAS 
member states while demand and supply shocks are 
largely responsible for the variability in exchange rate 
and domestic real output respectively. Demand shocks 
provoked the largest amount of variation in exchange 
rate (Fig. 4). This is a pointer to the fact that the 
strengthening the inter-demand relation by improving 
intra-regional trade, for instance, will make exchange 
rate a less compelling adjustment tool and hence reduce 
the cost of introducing a common currency (Haung and 
Guo, 2005). Monetary shocks provoked the highest 
degree of variability in inflation (Fig. 5). This is an 
affirmation of “The Monetarists” position that inflation 
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this study, we have committed ourselves to an 
evaluation of the feasibility of the proposed common 
currency in West Africa as the region is moving 
inexorably towards closer monetary cooperation. A 
multivariate structural VAR model was used to 
examine the symmetry of four kinds of disturbances 
affecting the region. They include external shocks, 
supply shocks, demand shocks and monetary shocks. 
Countries having positive and significantly correlated 
shocks are categorized as potential candidate for the 
proposed currency union. This is because synchronicity 
of national business cycles across the region implies 
that the economies are amendable to similar region-
wide policy measures. The study also emphasized the 
responses of the economy to the disturbances (impulse 
responses) and the decomposition of the disturbances 
into the component sources. The decomposition/ 
disaggregation of the shocks is important because 
differences in the cause of the variability in the 
countries could be indicative of underlying differences 
in policy strategies and transmission mechanisms which 
may be potential obstacles to regional monetary 
unification.  
In general, the correlations of structural shocks are 
asymmetric between the WAEMU and WAMZ 
countries, and among WAMZ countries, than they are 
among WAEMU countries. Further, results from the 
impulse responses of real exchange rate to structural 
shocks show that the  later  do  not converge. Therefore,  
it will not ideal to adopt a one-size-fits all exchange rate 
policy across the region. In line with the findings by 
Chuku (2012) and Taylor (2010) policy makers in West 
Africa should consider delaying the introduction of the 
proposed eco and work further towards stronger 
integration of the ECOWAS economies in terms of 
improvement in intra-regional trade and factor/labor 
mobility. This can be achieved through improvement 
and expansion in the network of infrastructure in the 
region as these will enhance the effectiveness of the 
alternative ways of adjustment to asymmetric 
disturbances, say, by improving the trade flow and 
factor mobility. Delaying the launch of the proposed 
eco will also afford policy makers the opportunity to 
learn from the prevailing debt and financial crisis being 
experienced in the Euro zone with a view to building 
pre-emptive strategies.  
Finally, based on the findings from this study, 
Policy Makers in West Africa should adopt 
“Incremental Convergence” approach to the 
introduction of a Common Currency in the region. This 
would involve:  
 
 Reducing the number of starting countries  
 Effecting the necessary policy reform with a view 
to improving the conditions for an OCA  
 appraising and reappraising the performance of the 
countries and taking off with those that satisfy the 
conditions  
 Admitting new countries that later meet the criteria  
 
In line with Taylor (2010), the finding from this 
study does not support selective expansion of the 
Existing Monetary Union (WAEMU) as prescribed by 
Masson and Pattillo (2005). It does not appear that there 
is any underlying reason why this strategy should be 
more successful. One argument may be that in being 
pegged to the Euro (externally determined), this 
encourages stability for the currency. This argument is 
no longer plausible given the debt and financial crisis 
rocking the member states of Euro zone and its 
implications on the stability of the CFA franc that is 
pegged to the Euro. In fact, the CFA franc countries 
may have something to learn from the proposed eco in 
terms of eco’s roots as an indigenous currency. The 
internal elements of eco may grant African countries a 
sense of ownership and responsibility to the currency 
and its underlying policies, possibly making them more 
responsible in decision making processes. Apart from 
reflecting a sense of involvement, it also forces them to 
become more engaged about the issues that they face 
and potential solutions that may exist. 
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